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WHEN CONTEXT MATTERS 
Analyzing conflicts with the use of big textual corpora from 
Russian and international social media 
 
Svetlana S. Bodrunova  
St. Petersburg State University 
 
 
1. Introduction. Zombies as a side of the conflict 
 
In February 2013, I was going quickly through a dataset collected from the Russian-
language Twitter starting from a range of hashtags and keywords describing a violent 
conflict in the Moscow district of Biryuliovo. During this conflict, the local Muscovites 
almost demolished a warehouse where hundreds of re-settlers from the post-Soviet 
Central Asia dwelled and traded, after an alleged killing of a local guy by an Azerbaijani. 
This conflict became the most widely discussed by the Russian media and on social 
media platforms out of a range of similar conflicts rising in various parts of Russia 
wherein a violent inter-personal trigger made deeper inter-group tensions show up, 
required the involvement of local authorities and, in some cases, yielded to changes in 
policymaking. 
While I was running through the dataset, I discovered a dozen tweets saying in Rus-
sian: 
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Urgent! Breaking! Zombies in #Biryuliovo!!! Attacking everyone! They’re everywhere! 
My team considered these tweets like spam or a crazy joke, irrelevant to the analysis 
and thus eliminated them from the sample. However, our choice seemed not to be the 
best one as, approximately one month later, we realized that there were three main 
actors in the conflict we were researching upon – namely, vegetables, zombies, and 
cosmonauts. Vegetables were the warehouse settlers: the word referred simultaneous-
ly to the vegetables that were the main object of storage at the warehouse and to veg-
etative state of mind. Zombies were the host communities who protested – they were 
rising up as zombies and coming from different directions to the warehouse, crushing 
windows and arguing with the police in an unstoppable manner. And the police men, in 
spherical helmets, were cosmonauts, the third party that represented the distant state 
existing somewhere out there in an outer space and never available on request. 
The zombies made us rethink the role of contextual knowledge for the analysis of big 
textual corpora, as these corpora oftentimes do not open up to researchers’ eyes in an 
expected way. Building on our research experience, in the remainder of this commen-
tary I will claim for bigger attention to contextual knowledge in current studies of polit-
ical conflicts, as contextual factors may turn online discussions into distorted mirrors of 
the respective societies and, hence, are relevant in relation to both the production and 
the interpretation of results. 
 
 
2. It is the context that matters 
 
After looking at the Biryuliovo case, we analyzed inter-ethnic conflicts on Twitter not 
only in Russia but also across the world – such as the Ferguson riots, the Cologne har-
assment and the Christmas Berlin bus crash, the Charlie Hebdo massacre and the Paris 
and Brussels attacks. Amongst other aspects, we looked at political polarization and 
political representation in these conflicts starting from the actual texts of tweets. Fol-
lowing the classic work by Tajfel and Turner (1979), we expected that the polarization 
of the online discussion would reflect a triple structure: the minority, the pro-minority 
majority, and the (largest, perhaps) anti-minority majority. However, the divisions we 
found were strikingly different from what we expected, and they could not be ex-
plained if not in relation to the wider context of political divisions and in light of the 
structures of the media systems, use of social networking platforms by audience 
groups, and the traditions of civil society.  
In particular, in several inter-ethnic conflicts that we analyzed which took place in 
Russia, the discourse was occupied by only two groups – pro-establishment and anti-
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establishment nationalists – and the only difference between them was that the first 
group openly supported the anti-migrant bashings and linked them to the “rising Rus-
sia”, while the second one blamed the authorities whom they perceived as the contin-
uation of the elites of 1990s who “stole the country”. No group or community formed a 
pro-migrant counterweight in these discussions. Such representation was the result of 
several colliding factors, none of which could be explained leaning only on the discus-
sion itself or considering exclusively elements such as the then very liberal policing to-
wards migration from the post-Soviet space (which was one of the reasons for the ris-
ing inter-ethnic tensions in various parts of the country). Other factors, external to po-
licing had, in our opinion, a bigger explanatory power. 
First, the political spectrum in Russia is virtually non-existent in the conventional 
Western terms - that is, the left-right divisions do not work as differentiators for social 
groupings the way they work in most West European countries. In the absence of clear 
rules of the game in a post-Communist de-classed society (Kordonsky 2008), social 
macro-divisions form along post-Soviet vs. hypothetical “Western” values (albeit this 
generalization overlooks the existing complexities of the Western social divisions) as 
well as along earning and consumption lifestyles (Zubarevich 2011; 2013). This deep 
fragmentation shapes the political system, creating a cleavage between the “systemic” 
powers that are represented in the lower chamber of the Russian Parliament, the State 
Duma, and the non-systemic powers outside of it – a wide-ranging array of political ac-
tors, from the new Communists to liberal, monarchist, and anarchist movements, be-
yond the “liberal opposition” that is often recalled by media. Thus, no ‘left-right’ posi-
tion clash could be expected to be found as sustaining the formation of majorities in a 
discussion over a socially polarizing issue, even a global one as immigration.  
Second, there was no one that defended the migrants, as no NGOs or local authori-
ties who could have balanced the anti-migrant voices were not active enough or, more 
precisely, completely absent from the discussion on Twitter. Similarly, no official repre-
sentatives of the migrants were heard enough. This, in turn, was a clear reflection of 
the well-described weakness of the Russian civil society (Henderson 2011; Gelman and 
Ross 2010; Chebankova 2013). As to the liberally-oriented media whose discourse usu-
ally includes a human rights perspective, in these cases they mostly preferred to be 
neutral and informational or decided to pose only rhetorical questions to the authori-
ties (Bodrunova et al. 2018).  
Third, and perhaps most importantly, in all these conflicts the use of Twitter by the 
migrants in Russian was close to zero. First, they rarely communicated in Russian at all, 
and thus were missing from the sample. Second, in 2013, unlike in 2016 when the first 
scarce data on their use of mobile phones was obtained (Abezgil’din 2016), this com-
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munity was, apparently, still using mostly button phones, not smartphones, and their 
use of computers was, as the same research suggests, lower in percentage compared 
to the Moscow host community. Thus, presumably, it was the structure of media con-
sumption that, in fact, shaped the picture of the discussion on Twitter.  
Here, we also need to note that platform use matters not only for the migrant com-
munity but de facto for any audience group in Russia. As many scholars have shown 
(Vartanova and Smirnov 2010; Bodrunova and Litvinenko 2015; Kiriya 2018), Russia has 
a peculiar social media market and audience structure. Thus, the main platform is not 
Facebook but Vkontakte, which catches a rather wide spectrum of audience’s political 
views and values but is perceived by the scholars as more or less depoliticized and full 
of trashy information. In fact, a research conducted by the Laboratory of Internet Stud-
ies at Higher School of Economics has shown that the collections of Vkontakte texts are 
relatively poor in terms of substantial political talk (Kotlsova and Koltcov 2013; Koltsova 
et al. 2017). The Russian-speaking segment of Facebook is a well-recognized echo 
chamber for 30+ liberal oppositional talk (Bodrunova and Litvinenko 2015; Kiriya 2018), 
even if there is lack of research that would bring on any percentages of the political 
views of its users. Similarly, the Russian-speaking Livejournal (livejournal.com) hosts 
tech-savvies and the writing and artistic community but, as we found out, a lot of con-
spiracy theories and biased ‘patriotic’ posts. Odnoklassniki (‘Classmates’, odnoklassni-
ki.ru or ok.ru), instead, is a place for several audience groups, among them inhabitants 
of the rural areas of any age (but mostly older people and schoolchildren) and city in-
habitants aged 50 or more. Even if there is a lack of data about the Russian-speaking 
segment of Twitter, there seems to be a different mode of representing politics than in 
the West. Politics is in fact discussed by media, nationalists/’patriots’, and bots, and the 
latter may, in some cases, dominate (Stukal et al. 2017). That is, upon none of these 
platforms, the expected configuration of the conflicting groups could be found. Thus, 
the group structure of platform use is a factor that undermines hypotheses about so-
cial interaction that are based on theories developed after studying offline conflicts.  
Fourth, the content of conventional media was never in favor of the migrant com-
munity. Several researches showed that print and online media, as well as the official 
discourse of the authorities, have significantly contributed to the formation of a one-
sided view towards migrants as stupid, uneducated, and barbarian in general (Karpen-
ko 2004; Mukomel’ 2011; Malakhov 2015), while statistics tell us that many Central 
Asian incomers had higher education and the re-settler community was, on the overall, 
more educated than that they left behind (see Bodrunova et al. 2017). On federal TV 
channels, migrants were highly under-represented; even when they were discussed, 
the discourse on migration followed that of the authorities, controversial and rarely 
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consistent (Hutchins and Tolz 2015). Thus, neither media content available for retweet-
ing could create any pro-migrant pole in the conflictual discussions.  
Against this background, what could one expect to find in a Twitter dataset? Defi-
nitely, not what we had expected leaning on theory. Instead, we found a nationalist 
and radicalized anti-immigrant talk, “objective” voices of media bots and of “not-that-
objective” political bots, and eyewitnesses of the bashings at the warehouse who tried 
to stay neutral but hardly could. Ultimately, in these cases of inter-ethnic conflicts, the 
Russian-speaking Twitter had become a pro-nationalist echo chamber that could not be 
balanced neither by the efforts of the official authorities (who, due to the clientelistic 
nature of Russian politics, are not interested in full and timely presence in microblogs) 
nor by those of the activist or of “ordinary users”.  
Albeit substantively different, inter-ethnic conflicts we studied for Germany and the 
USA were clearly just as content-dependent as the Russian one. In the discussion on 
New Year’s Eve night’s mass harassment of women in the center of Cologne, we could 
see the classic left-right divisions. However, the anti-immigrant cluster was overwhelm-
ingly bigger that the other and the pro-immigrant layer was led by left-leaning media 
like Sueddeutsche Zeitung or NGOs, thus reflecting not only the structure of the Ger-
man civil society but also the level of institutional presence on Twitter. Moreover, we 
could find an intermediary layer of people who united the two clusters and made them 
talk to each other (Bodrunova et al. 2018). 
The Ferguson case was, perhaps, the most surprising for us Russians, while it may 
not have been such for American media scholars. Here, the leaders of the discussion in 
the aftermath of the conflict were coming from the cultural sphere, like rap singers and 
priests. Moreover, the presence of the African-American community among the influ-
encers was much higher than we would expect in accordance with population statis-
tics, largely due to an intense use of Twitter by African Americans.  
Ultimately, the interpretation of the political polarization and of the dominant dis-
courses in all these inter-ethnic conflicts demanded a much wider knowledge on local 
political structures but also on media audiences and media content. Consistently, our 
expectations (including research questions and hypotheses) needed to be significantly 
corrected and context-bound, rather than coming directly out of the existing Western 
(or non-Western) theories. Eventually, our initial hypothesis never worked – the dis-
cussions were not about the minorities defending themselves and being defended 
against the views of the anti-minority part of the majority. Rather, online discussions 
were the distorted mirrors of the societies in which they were unfolding and were 
forming along deeper, more fundamental structural and values-based societal gaps. 
Perhaps, this conclusion may sound banal enough for social science researchers, but it 
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is often overlooked by data scientists with technical educational backgrounds. More 
relevantly, it was not only the social and political contexts that mattered. Also media, 
both in the form of content available for sharing and in the form of limitations of plat-
form use by social groups, were very important in shaping the discussions. Without fac-
toring in media and bringing in knowledge on them, our conclusions would have been 
be very limited, if not completely misleading. 
 
 
3. Theory-driven, data-driven, context-driven? 
 
Ongoing scholarly discussion on data-driven social science fluctuates between the 
over-optimistic view on big-data as “new ‘hypothesis‐neutral’ way of creating 
knowledge” (Mazzocchi 2015, 1250) and the defense of the theory- and hypotheses-
driven research that has been there for centuries, as “proponents of ‘data-driven’ and 
‘hypothesis-driven’ science argue over the best methods to turn massive amounts of 
data into knowledge” (Strasser 2012, 85).  
In this debate, the opposition between theory-driven and data-driven social science 
seems to be overlooking the crucial importance of context as a separate third type of 
information that shapes research designs and helps re-interpret findings. Even the 
most influential conceptual papers on the challenges of big data analysis seem to over-
look it (see, e.g., Fan et al. 2014; Burgess and Bruns 2012). This element demands more 
attention, as background information is often unavailable for the teams who try to do 
comparative studies and have good command of languages and history of the countries 
under scrutiny but not the current mediated discourses and peculiarities of political 
structures and cleavages.  
Decades of research in social science and humanities have elaborated mechanisms 
of incorporation of background knowledge, like grounded theory formation or a wide 
array of other methodologies in qualitative studies. And there is no doubt that the cri-
teria for rigorous qualitative knowledge should also apply to mixed-method research 
based on big datasets (Tracy 2010). In my opinion, it is the type of contextual 
knowledge that needs to be rethought, as, for political studies based on social media 
datasets, there are types of background information that next-to-always need to be 
taken into account. 
Defining what context needs to be taken into account often mixes with other issues 
of data collection and analysis, and yet it poses specific questions. Accounting for con-
text is not tantamount to the matter of replicability of existing studies, which many au-
thors, including Bruns (2013), mention as a growing issue in communication studies. 
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Similarly, it is not adherent to the issue of the technical nature of the data available on 
social media platforms, which shapes and “sometimes limits the type of analyses that 
can be conducted” (Weller and Kinder-Kurlanda 2015: 29; see also Giglietto et al. 
2012). It is different from the problem of personal biases and user features that distort 
and blur users’ views (Haggittai 2015) and it differs also from the problem of the lim-
ited access that academics have to data due to API affordances and other policies of 
the social media content providers (Puschmann and Burgess 2013) as well as from the 
distortions that come from how the data are extracted and datasets are made (Craw-
ford 2013; Gitelman 2013). Conversely, accounting for context is closer to the issue of 
non-representativity (boyd and Crawford 2012) as well as to the problem inherent to 
the datasets from real-world social media, which have that “aura of truth, objectivity, 
and accuracy” wisely identified by boyd and Crawford (2012) and that creates in the 
researchers a feeling that the results will anyway be telling and show how the world 
really is. As Hitchin notes, data create the feeling of “all-seeing, infallible God’s eye 
view” (Hitchin 2014, 4; see also Haraway 1991). Tufekci (2014) draws attention to-
wards the non-consideration of “field effects” – e.g. events external to online discus-
sions (including even weather) that change users’ behaviors, for example, determining 
country to country variations within the Arab Spring. In other words, researchers often 
expect that data will provide all the explanations, and, with a proper research method, 
would reveal on their own the answers to research questions. But even if there are 
cases when we need to “let the data speak for themselves” (Gould 1981), the point is 
that, unlike in astronomy or genome decoding, the results in studies of social media do 
not just live in context. More often, what can be seen within data is just a product of 
context. Thus, the distortions in the data may be even bigger than boyd and Crawford 
(2012) have famously described, claiming that “taken out of context, data lose meaning 
and value” (p. 670).  
In most cases, political studies of social big data (Manovich 2011; Bello-Orgaz et al. 
2016) can – and should – be understood as context-driven. Not in the sense that con-
text completely shapes the research hypotheses but in the sense that defining and ex-
ploring the relevant context needs to become a must to make sense of the datasets 
from social media, as well as to correct researchers’ expectations and interpretations. 
However, there is another question raised by this need to take context into account: 
will the embedding of contextual knowledge put another layer of constraints upon our 
reasoning and hypothesizing, which is already narrow enough to make the conclusions 
in methodologically diverse papers non-comparable? Will contextualization further 
prevent generalization based on many isolated research results? To avoid this, the po-
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litical studies community needs to elaborate what types of contexts and on which lev-
els of analysis we need to work with. 
I argue that the opposition between data-driven and hypotheses-driven research 
may be partly relieved by the use of context on different analytical levels similarly to 
what Pat Langley suggested for automated discovering of physical laws in massive data 
as early as in 1981 where “[t]he lowest levels correspond[ed] to direct observations, 
while the highest correspond[ed] to hypotheses that explain[ed] everything so far ob-
served” (Langley 1981, 31). Contextual knowledge may be used to better link the exist-
ing epistemological levels, without bringing researchers to the point at which they 
need to reformulate epistemologies towards data-driven science, an approach against 
which many scholars have raised their concerns (Frické 2015). 
 
 
4. Media-based contexts for cross-cultural research 
 
Context is always there, but it is perceived as highly case-dependent. However, as I 
argued above, political studies of social big data need to take into account the broader 
context and, even, multiple contexts and contextual areas, insofar as contexts shape 
the content of social media as well as the links between users. In this sense, accounting 
for context works as a filter to tune too abstract hypotheses and too abstract data-
driven expectations.   
Context is a challenge – especially for cross-cultural projects, which often yields to 
reduce their analytic scopes and limit the range of research questions that can be an-
swered. Nonetheless, this challenge can be transformed into a research opportunity, as 
exploration of relevant contexts may pose additional research questions that would al-
low for establishing the comparability of cases (for example, inter-ethnic conflicts) un-
der scrutiny. 
For instance, contextual areas would, perhaps, include cultural and linguistic aspects 
of national speech, or discursive taboos, or histories of the national discussions on a 
given topic. In the cases of the inter-ethnic conflicts that we were researching upon, 
political context such as the structure of civil society, political polarization and party 
spectra, was in fact very relevant. 
As a media scholar, however, I would claim again to focus on media-related con-
texts, as media today themselves constitute a context of increasing importance but 
which has remained relatively unstructured so far. 
Table 1 suggests some media-related aspects that our research group has found to 
be relevant in many projects in social media research on Russian, English, German, and 
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French-language datasets. In the table, I describe three domains of media-related con-
text – i.e., the outer media system, the platforms and their audiences, and the case-
specific context – for two stages of research – namely, preliminary exploration and in-
terpretation of research findings. Essentially, this proposed approach argues that 
knowledge on media contexts allows not only for more precise formulation of research 
hypotheses and selection of proxies but also helps evaluate research results against the 
known contexts.  
 
Table 1.  Media as context: suggestions for political studies 
 
Context domains Research stages 
Pre-hypothesis exploration, formulation of 
hypotheses, and selection of proxies 
Interpretation of results 
Outer media system  Structure of the politically relevant 
media segments  
 General structure of media bias 
 Audience cleavages and groups in 
media consumption 
 Relative activity of media on social 
networking platforms 
 Online/offline media parallelism 
Evaluation of presence and rela-
tive importance of media dis-
course induced: 
- via content sharing 
- via presence of media 
among influencers 
Platforms and               
platform audiences 
 Competition structure on the mar-
ket of social platforms 
 Profiles of average user 
 Amount of institutional presence 
(relevant media, political actors, 
commercial sector, NGOs etc.) 
 Amount of bots 
Evaluation of the results against: 
- the average user profile 
- amount of institutional 
presence  
- amount of bots 
Case-specific con-
texts 
 The role of particular media in for-
mation of streamlines in a given 
discussion offline 
 Possible limitations introduced by 
the platforms (bans of users, algo-
rithmic changes for a discussion 
etc.) 
Defining case differences and 
similarities linked to: 
- media roles in the discus-
sions 
- platform providers’ ap-
proaches  
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Within a sort of an “onion” domain structure, the first domain describes the media 
system in a given country outside the platform under scrutiny, including how the media 
segments (newspapers, TV channels, online media etc.) are structured in terms of polit-
ical bias, audience groups, online/offline presence, and activity in social media. This will 
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allow for assessing how exactly the existing media system can contribute to shape the 
discourse via two channels, namely content sharing by users and activity and populari-
ty of media accounts.  
The second domain focuses on the role of particular platforms and their typical au-
diences in forming a discussion, or, more precisely, on possible deviations of the audi-
ence profiles from population distributions. Here, one needs to consider existing data 
on the place of a given platform within the social media market, as well as the profile 
of its average user and/or major user groups. I also suggest that the actors whose activ-
ity significantly distorts the “natural” user talk are to be taken into account and, among 
them, particular attention should go to institutional and automated (bot-like) accounts.  
Finally, the third domain deals with how media and/or social networking platforms 
act within a particular discussion. In many cases, media behave as a bee swarm leaning 
the public opinion to a particular direction, and some media may change the pace and 
direction of the discussion by publishing breaking news. Also, platforms introduce limi-
tations on what can and cannot be discussed. Of course, for each particular project, 
evaluation of the suggested aspects is subject to available knowledge. This, in its turn, 
raises an issue of having enough research, both nationally and cross-culturally, on me-
dia and platforms, their content, markets, and audiences. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The analysis of how users talk about political conflicts led us to several conclusions 
on the necessity to embed more contextual (background) knowledge into studies 
based on social big data. To summarize the arguments stated above, I propose a list of 
key points to the argument of this commentary: 
1. Societies still matter. Their political polarization, civil activism, media audienc-
es, and discursive traditions shape online discussions to the extent that they become 
distorted mirrors of societies themselves. 
2. This creates the necessity of taking context into account – and raises the ques-
tion of what contexts need to be studied, and how exactly.  
3. Contexts may be used as “reality filters” to tune both exclusively theory-driven 
and data-driven academic approaches. Moreover, they can also become a research 
space in their own right. 
4. Within contextual factors, media-related aspects are of increasing importance. 
These include available media content to share, media bias within various segments of 
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media markets, the structure of the market of social-communicative platforms, and 
platforms, views, and values-based audience grouping;  
5. Media scholars should be involved more often into political and social science 
research on political and social issues whenever social media data are used. 
6. Zombies can be real. 
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